Walk Away from Mortgage if Underwater: Professor Paper


underwater hime mortgage

In his must-read October 2009 paper “Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis“, Professor Brent T. White, of the University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, submits the case that homeowners should walk away from mortgage payments if their house is far enough “underwater” (mortgage debt is more than the house is worth).  It’s not illegal, immoral (or fattening), despite what banks, government and others tell you.  In fact, there can be financial benefits, if you do the math (especially in California, Florida, Arizona, Nevada).

And, if you default “strategically“, the punishment is bearable:

To be sure, foreclosure comes with costs, including a significant negative impact on one’s credit rating.  But assuming one had otherwise good credit, and continues to meet other credit obligations, one can have a good credit rating again – meaning above 660 – within two years after a foreclosure. (emphasis added)…..

Additionally, in  as little as three years, one can qualify for  a federally-insured FHA loan to purchase another home….

…a few years of poor credit shouldn’t cost more than few thousand dollars

Here is an Abstract of the Paper:

Despite reports that homeowners are increasingly “walking away” from their mortgages, most homeowners continue to make their payments even when they are significantly underwater. This article suggests that most homeowners choose not to strategically default as a result of two emotional forces: 1) the desire to avoid the shame and guilt of foreclosure; and 2) exaggerated anxiety over foreclosure’s perceived consequences. Moreover, these emotional constraints are actively cultivated by the government and other social control agents in order to encourage homeowners to follow social and moral norms related to the honoring of financial obligations – and to ignore market and legal norms under which strategic default might be both viable and the wisest financial decision. Norms governing homeowner behavior stand in sharp contrast to norms governing lenders, who seek to maximize profits or minimize losses irrespective of concerns of morality or social responsibility. This norm asymmetry leads to distributional inequalities in which individual homeowners shoulder a disproportionate burden from the housing collapse.

Some crib notes:

  • underwater homeowners aren’t knowingly making bad choices, they just can’t cognitively grasp that they would be better off if they walked away from their mortgages.
  • credit rating agencies play a central role as enforcers of moral and social norms against walking away from one’s mortgage.
  • the consequences of foreclosure are, in actuality, much less severe than most homeowners have been led to believe.
  • lenders  have generally resisted calls to modify underwater mortgages  despite the fact that it would be both socially beneficial and morally responsible for them to do so.
  • As of June 2009, more than 32% of all mortgaged properties in the U.S. were “underwater”.  This percentage is expected to increase to 48% by the first quarter of 2011.
  • the  percentage of underwater mortgages is higher still if one isolates the hardest hit metropolitan areas
  • the vast majority of defaults have involved subprime or Alt-A  loans– with over 47 percent of subprime loans non-performing as of the second quarter of 2009. In contrast, the combined default rate for prime loans was only 5.44 percent.
  • rent v. buy:  As a rule of thumb, a potential homebuyer is generally better off renting when the home price exceeds 15 or 16 times the annual rent for comparable homes.
  • The most significant financial risk from a foreclosure is the risk of a deficiency judgment or, in the alternative, tax liability for the unsatisfied portion of one’s loan upon foreclosure.  [But not all states allow banks to come after the homeowner for a deficiency judgment]
  • Homeowners refuse to default to save money because of what behavioral economists call the status quo bias..  selective perception.. and emotional bias
  • recent work of Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales found that 81% of homeowners believe that it is immoral to default on a mortgage
  • another powerful emotion that may be keeping homeowners from defaulting:  fear.  People not only fear losing their homes, but fear having ruined credit for life, not be able to find a decent place to live, to buy a car, to get a credit card, to get insurance, to ever buy a house, or even get a job.
  • buyers have a contractual right [option?] to default

The Social Control Agents Cultivate  Homeowners’ Fear

Banks, government, and credit institutions cultivate feelings of guilt, immorality and fear to keep homeowners from defaulting, fearing a foreclosure tipping point.   But while the government offers programs to make payments affordable, banks are lax in modifying loans and thus help keep payments unaffordable– which will encourage folks to walk away from underwater homes.

Folks have suggested this bank non-modification behavior is contrary to their own self-interest in getting paid over losing money on foreclosed homes. Others say it is greed and knowledge of human nature. They know creditworthy folks won’t default for fear of the whack on their credit score– now a measure of pride, social status, and self-worth.  Banks often tell homeowners to default,  before they will entertain the thought of a modification— a clever test to see if the homeowner will do it– most don’t.  And if they do default, the banks point out their credit score drop makes a loan mod undoable. Catch-22.

Strategic Default

White advises homeowners who can save a lot of money by walking on the mortgage to default “strategically” before bailing on the current mortgage:

….one who plans to strategically default can take steps to minimize even this marginal cost [of poor credit for 2 years].  For example, one could purchase a new vehicle, secure a new home to rent, or even purchase a new house before beginning the process of defaulting on one’s mortgage.

While the greatest financial risk is a deficiency judgment against the homeowner, it is not across the board.  In anti-deficiency, non-recourse, states like California and Arizona, mortgage lenders have limited or no legal rights to pursue defaulting homeowners’ assets beyond the house itself, if the home is the primary residence, Prof. White writes.  In other states, lenders may decide it’s not worth the legal expense (and headache) to pursue walkaways.  Besides, consumers may be able to find flaws in the mortgage note or lending documents, disclosures or underwriting to challenge the original contract.

How Much Can You Save from Walking Away?

It depends on how far underwater you are.  On page 11, White gives an amazing example of the “financial benefit” from walking away from a house  well “underwater”:

(Sam & Chris) they still owe about $560,000 on their home, now only worth $187,000. A similar house around the corner from Sam and Chris recently listed for $179,000, which, with a modest 5% down, would translate to a total monthly  payment of less than $1200 per month – as compared to the $4300that they currently pay.  They could rent a similar house in the neighborhood for about $1000.

Assuming they intend to stay in their home ten years, Sam and Chris would save approximately $340,000 by walking away including a monthly savings of at least $1700 on rent verses mortgage payments, even after factoring in the mortgage interest tax reduction. The financial gain for Sam and Chris from walking away would be even more substantial if they took their monthly savings and put it into an investment account. If they stay in their home on the other hand, it will take Sam and Chris over 60 years just to recover their equity – assuming, of course, that they live that long, the market in Salinas has indeed hit bottom, and their home appreciates at the historical appreciation rate of 3.5%.

Wow.

This 54 page paper is well worth a read. You might share it with a client whose bank has not agreed to a loan modification, along with the names and phone numbers of a lawyer and accountant — to explain the law and do the number crunching on a walkaway.   Will anyone dare share this option with their clients?

Related Post:

What Banks Will Not Tell You: You Might Not Be Liable if You Walk Away From Your Mortgage.

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  • douglaslsakiestewa
    The article is very thoughtful. At the time of buying a house I should have spent weeks reading and interpreting all the deed clauses before signing which was rushed always as I have purchased many houses and sold before moving on. All the motgage clauses protect the lender. Then one day I thought all comes from the credit rating I once was given, allowed, granted, obtained, or created by some credit rating group. Further I wanted to know if the credit rating systems are unconstitutional anyway. I never got to respond to my first credit rating, nor was it ever negotiated. So I feel I never had due process allowed by the U.S. Constitition. I still feel the credit rating systems are unconstitutional has it results in so much denial of health, welfare, safety and overall inability to have the "American Dream."
  • It is never nice to talk about cutting losses, but the topic has arisen and the arguments are valid. Why are the small guys getting screwed, while the fat cats that engineered this catastrophy is getting bonuses paid with economic bail out money?
  • John Grever
    It's interesting that banks and businesses don't feel any of these moral compulsions when making their financial decisions, yet few don't feel that their clients should. You sure didn't see many banks having any moral conflict over taking taxpayer money during the bailout.
  • The bailout money was not a donation except in one or two cases. They were loans. Almost all are going to be repaid in full.

    There is also significant evidence that banks were forced to take the bailouts by Bush's Secretary of the Treasury, Paulson. It was also a balance sheet issue. They didn't need the money to fund loans. They needed it for reserves required under Sarbanes-Oxley as a result of the Enron scandal (required to balance out asset losses related to declining real estate values). So, technically, the banks didn't need the cash, and didn't need the bailout. Note how quickly banks are paying back the money: many if not most have already returned the money.

    As a business leader, I do feel a moral compulsion to repay my business debts, as do most of us. Please stop lumping business leaders into this evil capitalist paradigm. It is rarely the case. Usually the bad ones go to jail.
  • 10thdegreemarketing
    If you can afford the mortgage payments, and you don't need to move, then why default? There is also the social issue, where you could make things worse for your neighbors by walking away from a mortgage, because a foreclosure may cause home prices to drop.
  • I wouldn't lump all 100% no doc mortgages into a non-affordable category. Sure, many or even most of them are tough on the buyers. But, when the buyer accepted the no-doc to get a better rate, or to even get a house period, the buyer accepted the risk as much as the lender did. There is responsibility on both sides of the table. Many media reports seem only concerned with the "plight of the little guy" against mortgage companies, so the general feeling has shifted to feel sorry for the person getting foreclosed on when lenders and neighbors are the ones really suffering through the downturn.

    That said, there are reasonable times to default whether it is a no-doc or not. I can understand a default with someone who has an ARM going into the stratosphere when that person doesn't have the income to support it (the buyer still maintains some responsibility due to accepting the loan this way). In general, I'd say the ethical thing to do for an owner is to try to pay as much as they can, make attempts at loan mods, look at refi's, moving to a short sale if possible before they reach foreclosure. Since they made a promise to pay on the mortgage, it is simply the right thing to do. This would apply to any loan, even good prime loans where the owner has fallen on hard times. Many owners are reportedly not helping the mortgage company process their loan mods, and many more are simply sticking their heads in the sand and ignoring the situation. These thoughts are a bit of a generalization, but I think the professor's case is an example of unethical behavior.

    Using foreclosures for values seems to be exactly what the professor did, but that's an assumption on my part. To answer your question, no I don't think the foreclosures should be used for valuations. However, every house in the neighborhood is impacted because the high number of foreclosures forces a seller to compete against the foreclosures. Many buyers go to the foreclosures first, then look at the "nice" homes; sellers are having to discount their properties to compete and generate interest. There is probably a point where you do have to use foreclosures for neighborhoods that have a higher than normal concentration of foreclosed homes on the market...those homes have become a part of that market and must be considered....but that is a rare case. In my market, I can't think of a neighborhood where that would apply.

    I don't think the bank should be concerned with the neighbors. I don't know how bank's have to report their properties on their balance sheets, but I think they could better serve themselves and their investors by holding on to property longer, and demanding higher prices. If all banks were doing this, then prices wouldn't have declined as much, and the financial crisis would have been slowed if not averted. They could even get a property inspection done, and fix issues themselves, or contract with a local flipper that can do repairs and bring up to a livable standard. It would help everyone. If they had done this from the beginning, would we have even had a recession?
  • Since there are consequences to the defaulting party, the choice to walk
    away seems just between bank and borrower. Every mortgage has a risk of
    default, hence the interest rate and the right to take back the asset, even
    at risk the asset may have decreased in value, including from factors other
    than the economy. And if we peel back the onion layers, we might cry that
    those ultimately in control of lending practices and loan products, Fannie &
    Freddie, and those that traded the paper, built the house of cards which
    fell. Can we say with certainty the loss should ethically fall completely,
    if at all, on the borrower? Even though they wanted easy money to buy homes
    with historically high P/R ratios, the lender could have said no.

    If a client is so far underwater & can't afford to pay w/ARMs or whatever,
    keeping his word adversely affects his family and may STILL result in his
    defaulting, after bleeding his finances to zero. Then the ripple effect
    causes other creditors not to be paid and less money to be put into the
    economy. If the strategic default is walk from the home, give it back to
    the bank so you can save money, pay your other creditors and spend in the
    economy, that may be fair/ethical. It's a toughie, Rainer.
  • Thanks Rainer for your thoughtful comment. I see your point in the case of affordability. I'm interested in your opinion on the non-affordable loans on underwater property-- those folks who got a 100% no-doc mortgage -- in those cases, the bank took the risk the buyer was NOT really qualified for this loan. In either case, if the default is unethical, there is a punishment beyond money damages-- the loss of credit score.
    The effect on neighbors is a concern, esp. if they are trying to sell and must compete against foreclosures. But is it fair to use foreclosure sales to lower property values? -- if so, the folks (or AVMs) who do the valuation are screwing the neighbors. Perhaps the loan modification in non affordable cases is the better way for a bank to go, assuming they are concerned with the neighbors.
  • How is it not immoral to walk away from a loan you CAN pay? Sometimes math may make the situation look good, but do the ends justify the means?

    The purchaser made a contract...a promise to pay on the mortgage. They accepted the risk of falling values.

    Furthermore, if the person intended to stay in the house, then prices will come back up.

    They might save some money in the short term, but will pay more when they get an FHA loan 3 years from now for the same type of house as prices come back up....they'll have closing costs in addition to yet another 30 year mortgage they have yet to pay a dime of interest on. Throw in increases in any other type of adjustable rate loan the moment a foreclosure hits their credit, and their costs skyrocket.

    Most homes haven't dropped 66.6% in value as in the example. I also find it very strange the property value was exactly two thirds of the amount owed.

    "Strategically defaulting" also hurts everyone else in the neighborhood. So, doing it for the good of the one family causes more price declines and further hurts the market, forcing more people underwater...boosting further declines in the market.

    I think this professor should stop looking at only numbers he wants to use and take an ethics course.
  • Interesting. I had not seen it put so bluntly before.

    -Tyler
  • Bravo...great piece. This is an area that many financial advisors steer clear of.
  • jeffallen
    Fascinating stuff.
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